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When di⁄erent layers of government exert their taxing power upon a common base, the de-
cisions made by one tier a⁄ect the receipts that the other policymakers can collect. Likewise,
when same level authorities derive their receipts from a mobile tax base, a competition mecha-
nism takes place that triggers externalities. This paper proposes a model where both horizontal
and vertical interactions take place. Uncertainty concerning the base, that is, the amount of
capital likely to be invested, is introduced and a generalization of taxation schemes is provided
through the choice of the instruments, in order to assess the robustness of traditional analyses
results in a more general and realistic scheme. With respect to a unique government framework,
an excessively high level of taxation emerges from the simultaneous interplay of horizontal and
vertical tax externalities.
Keywords : Vertical and horizontal tax externalities, Informational asymmetry, Tax compe-
tition, Common Agency, Nonlinear taxes.
JEL Classi￿cation : D72, D82, H23, H30, H32, H71, H77.
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11 Introduction
Mobile tax bases are at the root of strategic tax competition, both within and between
countries. Vying for mobile tax bases has been shown to put downward pressure on the degree
of taxation. Indeed, when a decisionmaker unilaterally and independently raises her tax rate,
the mobile base can move into neighbouring jurisdictions, thereby reducing the amount of tax
receipts that can be collected in the locality that implemented a hike. As a result, same-level
benevolent governments that noncooperatively make their decisions tend to levy tax rates and
provide a supply of public good that are ine¢ ciently low. On the other hand, when policymakers
are Leviathan, horizontal tax competition improves social welfare because it exerts a constraint
on revenue maximizers (Brennan and Buchanan (1977)) 1.
Extensive literature has been devoted to ￿scal competition between same-level jurisdictions.
The vertical dimension of intergovernmental tax relationships also appears as a crucial issue.
Actually, multileveled governments represent a common feature of ￿scal arrangements, not
only in such federations as Canada, where 70% of provincial goverments￿tax receipts come
from overlapping bases, but also in such centralized states as France, where this mechanism
accounts for the greatest part of local tax revenue. When a layer of authority unilaterally
chooses to raise its tax rate, it ignores the losses of receipts that the other levels su⁄er from
the induced contraction of the shared tax base. Consequently, the full social marginal cost of
raising tax revenue from the common base is not taken into account. Contrary to the horizontal-
tax-competition case, a "race to the top" can emerge. Thus, the sharing of some tax bases by
di⁄erent levels of governments in multitiered tax architecture points to the existence of vertical
externalities2. Because both horizontal and vertical ￿scal external e⁄ects come into play in
territorial organizations, it appears relevant to take them into account simultaneously and to
analyse the interactions between them.
Some authors have introduced an important assumption in the analyses of tax competition.
They have considered that the level of mobile tax base is not common knowledge, which in-
volves informational asymmetries3. Indeed, informational issues can represent a key element in
the relationship between tax-payers and governments. Besides, taxation problems in multilayer
government schemes can be seen as multiprincipal problems. In some cases, the agent (i.e. the
taxpayer) may have a better knowledge than governments concerning one relevant parameter
of hers. Models analyzing the interactions between several principals can help improve the com-
prehension and knowledge of constitutional structures in which rival powers interact, especially
as many principals (the governments) often contract with a unique and common agent (the
taxpayer) 4. Unlike perfect information frameworks, in such models, governments compete in
1Another kind of explanation of the interaction between same-level governments has received growing at-
tention : the mechanism of political yardstick competition, which states that voters can use the performances
of neighboring governments as a yardstick to assess the e¢ ciency of their representative o¢ cials and decide
accordingly whether to re-elect them or not. This mechanism can lead to higher tax rates than the levels that
would be necessary to ￿nance the amount of public good required by citizens, because some kind of collusion
process can take place amongst them.
2A brief survey of these works is provided in Section 2.
3Martimort 1992, Laussel and Lebreton 1993, 1994).
4Martimort and Stole (2003).
2tax schedules, that is, functions that link the level of taxes on capital to the amount of capital
invested in each jurisdiction. Nonlinear instruments allow a better adjustment to uncertainty
than do ￿xed tax rates when decisionmakers cannot commit to strategic variables. Such ins-
truments permit jurisdictions to achieve higher expected payo⁄s and allow a formulation of
the tax problem that more closely corresponds to the actual tax systems. Thus, we propose
a model introducing uncertainty as to the amount of capital and addressing the problem as a
principal-agent game, which enables us to examine the interaction of horizontal and vertical
e⁄ects.
This article has the following structure : The ￿rst two sections summarize the main ￿ndings
of traditional literature and introduce the model we use to address tax competition. Section
III displays the benchmark case, that is the setting of the unique government. The framework
adopted involves uncertainty concerning the amount of capital likely to be locally invested and
generalizes taxation schemes via the design of nonlinear instruments. Section IV is dedicated
to the analysis of the vertical external e⁄ect while the last section investigates the interaction
between horizontal and vertical tax externalities.
2 Main ￿ndings about vertical tax externalities
Vertical tax externalities represent a growing concern as the number of multitiered-governments
settings expands (in federal or unitary states as well as in organizations such as the European
Union). As they become more and more complex, it seems relevant to deepen and improve the
our understanding not only of vertical e⁄ects but also of their interplay with horizontal tax
competition.
2.1 Excluding horizontal tax externalities
The mechanism of vertical tax externality stemming from the co-occupancy of tax bases
between several tiers of government was ￿rst analysed by Cassing and Hillman (1982). The
federal government of Australia levies taxes both on export and output. Tax receipts are thus
collected on the coal transported by train up to the harbour. Meanwhile, the state of Queens-
land holds a monopoly on railroads and taxes freight. With respect to a cooperative situation,
the competition between these two Leviathan public decisionmakers leads to a shrinkage in
the potential amount of tax receipts and increases the deadweight losses as a same resource is
taxed twice. These conclusions were highlighted by the pionner work of Flowers (1988). Based
on Brennan and Buchanan (1980), this model examines a situation in which two di⁄erent layers
of government eager to maximize their ￿scal revenue tax a common mobile base. With respect
to a unique government setting, the addition of a second authority endowed with tax powers
induces an erosion of the common base. As each layer ignores the revenue losses incurred by the
other policymaker when he raises his rate, the marginal cost of raising tax revenue from the
common base is underestimated and the global tax rate is thereby excessively high. Besides, as
demonstrated by Sobel (1997), the distorsion is strengthened in a sequential framework. In fact,
3the Stackelberg leader anticipates the revenue reduction and seeks to compensate for this e⁄ect
through a hike in his tax level. The study performed by Keen (1998) in a framework of consump-
tion taxes posts an exhaustive presentation of the main e⁄ects stemming from tax stacking.
The author shows that when the lower level is Leviathan, federal and local taxes are strategic
complements if the price-elasticity of the good demand is constant. If local decisionmakers are
benevolent, two additional e⁄ects appear : The decrease of demand for the good because of the
consumer price rise (which lessens the loss of consumer welfare), and the reduced production
of the local public good due to the shrinkage of the tax base (which makes the increase of local
public good through higher tax rates more attractive). These main conclusions were generali-
zed by Flochel and MadiŁs (2002) in a context borrowed from industrial organization5. With
Leviathan governments and imperfect mobility of the taxed base, that is capital, the global tax
rate to which the common base is subject results as a growing function of stacked layers.
In order to check the existence of such e⁄ects in a hierarchically nested governments fra-
mework, Besley and Rosen (1998) lead an empiric analysis on excise taxes in United States.
They estimate the impact of changes in federal tax policy on states tax decisions. Four kinds of
reaction can appear : a revenue e⁄ect that describes the local government reaction to maintain
his revenue when the federal government raises his tax rate, the deadweight loss e⁄ect related
to the fact that, all things equal, the marginal disutility of tax increases with the rate (that
is taxes are complement), the tax complement or substitution e⁄ect when demand cannot be
di⁄erentiated, and a spending e⁄ect according to which tax receipts decrease when the federal
tax rate is raised. An increase of 10% in the unitary federal tax rate on cigarettes triggers an
increase of 2,8% of the local unitary tax rate; the same increase for gasoline induces a 4,1% rise
of the local tax. Esteller-MorØ and SolØ-OlØ (2001) analysed personal income and general sales
taxes. They found that US state taxes reacted positively to increases in federal taxes. Likewise,
examining Canadian income taxes, Esteller-MorØ and SolØ-OlØ (2002) stressed a positive res-
ponse of provincial tax rates to changes in the federal tax rates. On the other hand, Hayashi
and Boadway (2001) found a negative correlation, also enhanced by Goodspeed (2000) in a
panel of OECD countries. Empirical work yields results that vary according to the assumptions
of the model studied.
2.2 Combined horizontal and vertical tax externalities
Keen (1995) shows that both externalities point in di⁄erent directions when a tax base over-
lap is combined to horizontal tax competition and that the economy ends up on the downward
sloping side of the La⁄er curve.
The net impact of the interaction between horizontal and vertical externalities appears ra-
ther ambiguous and assumption-dependent. Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002), (2004) tackle this
issue through a model of benevolent governments, based on Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986)
with the addition of a higher level of policymaker and an endogeneized supply of capital. They
5The authors develop a Salop spatial competition model in which local jurisdictions are uniformly distributed
and ￿rms are represented by a continuum of investors that sequentially make their location in function of the
central tax rate and then of the local tax rate and local variables.
4show that the ￿nal e⁄ect depends on the elasticity of savings supply, capital demand, the level
of income taxation, households￿preferences for local or national public goods, the degree of
mobility of the tax base... Br￿lhart and Jametti (2004) adopt a similar aproach in an interna-
tional setting. The domination of the vertical externality depends on the part of the local public
good in the utility function, of the relative elasticity of capital... In a Leviathan policymakers
framework, Keen and Kotsogiannis (2003) prove that receipts are strictly higher for both local
and federal governments if the tax rate is reduced by at least one of them. Furthermore, when
the public goods provided by the di⁄erent tiers of governments are substitute, social welfare
also increases.
Through an industrial organization point of view, Flochel and MadiŁs (2002) also analyze the
resulting e⁄ect of simultaneous horizontal and vertical competition in a federal government in
which decisionmakers seek to maximize their revenue. They show that the competition between
same level policymakers reduces the cumulated tax rate but cannot totally o⁄set the vertical
externality.
Thus, these analyses suggest that the vertical e⁄ect tends to dominate.
3 A model of taxation with nonlinear instruments : Fra-
mework and main assumptions
We propose a model that takes information asymmetries into account and that studies tax
interactions among di⁄erent layers of governments, with one of them being composed of many
jurisdictions competing for ￿rms. This is a common agency game setting in which the agent,
that is the ￿rm, holds a private information about the amount of capital available, whereas the
governments are the unperfectly informed principals6.
3.1 Choice of the instruments
In common agency settings, two types of externalities may arise : a direct e⁄ect via a common
parameter, and a contractual externality as the actions taken by one principal necessarily a⁄ect
the situation of the other ones (Martimort and Stole, 2002). Besides, one principal may induce
the agent to misrepresent to other principals, which can make truthful equilibria disappear and
thus prevents the use of the Revelation Principle. In a one-principal setting, a nonlinear schedule
can replicate the same outcome as any deterministic direct communication process; there is
no loss of generality in con￿ning to strategically decentralized menus of relevant contracting
parameters : This is the Taxation Principle (Guesnerie, 1981, 1995, and Rochet, 1986). In
multiprincipals frameworks, this Principle becomes the Delegation Principle.
6In such all-or-nothing games in which the agent cannot restrict to contract with only some of the principals,
diversifying investment is a better strategy for the ￿rm than instead investing locally all the capital she owns
(either in only one or in both jurisdictions) or directing it to the alternative economic area.
5In this paper, we choose to endogeneize the instruments used, that is we consider nonlinear
taxes which allow a better analysis of the ￿rm￿ s investment choices and governments￿policies.
This choice is justi￿ed not only from a theoretical point of view (as the ￿rm holds private
information) but also rests on practical grounds. Indeed, though corporate taxes are usually
proportional, often tax advantages are o⁄ered that make them depart from mere proportional
taxes (deductible capital allowances, tax exemptions...) and support the use of nonlinear ins-
truments. As explained by Olsen and Osmundsen (2001), governments should be less informed
than the ￿rm concerning some features of hers because of the international nature of major
enterprises, of inter￿rm transactions, of complex technologies that imply obstacles for the au-
thorities to ascertain the ￿rm￿ s e¢ ciency... As a result, the instruments are not lump-sum, they
depend on the agents￿choices and involve incentive e⁄ects.
3.2 The players
We consider an organization made of two same-level governments, the jurisdictions, suppo-
sed to be identical in all relevant aspects, and of an upper-tier authority. All decisionmakers
are considered to be endowed with independent spending and taxing powers. Local govern-
ments can contract with the ￿rm on the amount of capital she invests in the jurisdictions. The
higher-level government can tax the whole amount of capital locally invested. Tax authorities
are supposed to be Leviathan7.
We assume there is a unique ￿rm that can invest its capital either in one locality or in both
of them, or else dedicate it to another use. The amount of capital available for investment,





. The prior of the governments relative to ￿ are described by a common knowledge
law represented by the continuous distribution function G(￿) and the strictly positive density












3.3 Problem of the investor
The ￿rm ￿ receives the output (prices are normalized to one) minus the taxes and the pro￿t
writes
U (￿) = ff (k1) ￿ T (k1) + f (k2) ￿ T (k2) ￿ ￿ (k1 + k2) + M (￿ ￿ k1 ￿ k2)g:
T (ki) designs the taxe levied by the local government of jurisdiction i (i=1,2) on the amount




ki (￿). We consider that capital cannot be subsidized, that is marginal taxes are
necessarily positive.
7According to Brennan and Buchanan (1980), if self-interested policymakers undertake inappropriate expen-
diture or use them ine¢ ciently, capital mobility may limit these ine¢ ciencies and constrain the expansionary
tendencies of the public sector.
6We denote f (ki (￿)) the output in jurisdiction i as a function of the capital locally invested.
f (￿) is three times continuously di⁄erentiable, f0 (￿) > 0, f (0) = 0, f00 (￿) < 0 : the produc-
tion function is assumed to be monotonously increasing in capital with decreasingly pro￿table
successive units of capital as the capital stock expands.
M (￿ ￿ k1 (￿) ￿ k2 (￿)) represents the opportunity bene￿t of not investing locally all the
capital available. M (￿) is exogenous, increasing and strictly concave : M0 (￿) > 0, M"(￿) < 0.
Besides, we assume that M000 (￿) > 08.
The ￿rm faces countervailing incentives. On the hand, she is eager to appear as a low-type
￿rm in order to reduce the tax requirements she is addressed. On the other hand, it may be
bene￿cial for her to report having a high amount of capital available in order to appear likely
to reschedule investment.
We consider there is a unique homogenous good produced by the jurisdiction and taken as
numeraire. The only production factor is capital (for a simplicity stake, we do not make the
assumption of a ￿xed factor). The good can be either consumed or used as an input in the
production of the local public good.
4 Benchmark situation : A Unique Decisionmaker
We assume there is a unique revenue-maximizing government.
An investor has to choose the level of capital to be invested in each jurisdiction (under the
constraint not to invest more capital than what she owns).
Whatever his type ￿ 2 ￿, an agent that accepts the contract makes an announcement ￿
a
and is thus required to pay a tax t(￿
a), while he is induced to invest a fraction k (￿
a) of the
capital at his disposal. The best choice for the ￿rm being to tell the truth,
U (￿) = max
￿a ff (k (￿
a)) ￿ t(￿
a) + M (￿ ￿ k (￿
a))g:
The following conditions are necessary and su¢ cient for the contract to be incentive :
￿
U (￿) = M
0 (￿ ￿ k (￿));
￿
k (￿) > 0:
The Taxation Principle allows the implementation of incentive nonlinear schemes, making
the optimal tax depend on the amount of capital invested fT (k (￿))g.
8It would be su¢ cient for the problem to be concave that the following condition be satis￿ed :
M000 (￿ ￿ k)






















5; 8 ￿;k; 8m 2 R￿
+:
7k (￿) is a strictly monotonically increasing function, so it can be inverted to yield ￿ as a
function of k. fT (k)g = t(k￿1 (￿)), tax schedules are assumed to be deterministic and twice
continuously di⁄erentiable. We consider indirect mechanisms.





T (k (￿))g (￿)d￿ (1)
subject to
U (￿) = f (k (￿)) ￿ T (k (￿)) + M (￿ ￿ k (￿)) ￿ 0 (2)
￿
U (￿) = M
0 (￿ ￿ k (￿)) (3)
￿
k (￿) > 0: (4)
The informational gap stemming from the ￿rm￿ s better knowledge of a relevant characteristic










0 (￿ ￿ k (￿))g (￿)d￿:








0 (￿ ￿ k (￿))
￿
g (￿)d￿:
from which we can derive the ￿rst order condition :
f
0 (k (￿)) = M
0 (￿ ￿ k (￿)) ￿
1 ￿ G(￿)
g (￿)
M"(￿ ￿ k (￿))







0 (k (￿)) ￿ M
0 (￿ ￿ k (￿))















9In the perfect information case, as the government would know the amount of capital available for invest-
ment, it would be equivalent to make taxes depend on k or on ￿, and he could restrict to direct contract.
8Remark : it is important to check whether marginal tax rates are an increasing or a decrea-
sing function of the amount of capital invested10.
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5 ￿ 0 :
The more the ￿rm invests in the jurisdiction, the less the marginal tax rate can be raised.
Not only the mobility of the agent but also and above all his private information strongly a⁄ect
the government￿ s ability to implement its preferred tax policy.
5 Concurrent taxation of a common base
We consider that two di⁄erent levels of government, with only one decisionmaker a layer,
simultaneously and non cooperatively levy taxes on ￿rms. Both bottom-up and top-down tax
externalities can arise.
The pro￿t of a ￿rm ￿ writes
U (￿) = f (k (￿)) ￿ T (k (￿)) ￿ ￿ (k (￿)) + M (￿ ￿ k (￿)):





T (k (￿))g (￿)d￿ =
￿ Z
￿
[f (k (￿)) + M (￿ ￿ k (￿)) ￿ ￿ (k (￿)) ￿ U (￿)]g (￿)d￿
subject to
U (￿) = f (k (￿)) ￿ T (k (￿)) ￿ ￿ (k (￿)) + M (￿ ￿ k (￿)) ￿ 0 (7)
￿
U (￿) = M
0 (￿ ￿ k (￿))
￿
k (￿) > 0:
We use the same methodology as in the previous part. The resolution is straightforward and






























































If we consider the following concave function ’(k) = f (k (￿))+M (￿ ￿ k (￿))￿
1 ￿ G(￿)
g (￿)
M0 (￿ ￿ k (￿))
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The marginal tax rate that any policymaker can implement is reduced as less capital is
invested. Yet, the global tax rate remains higher than the degree of taxation charged in the
reference case : the vertical external e⁄ect dominates.
Proposition 1 : The presence of another decisionmaker leads any tier of government to
lower its tax rate with respect to a cooperative framework. However, each revenue-maximizer
layer does not take into account the negative externality conveyed upon the other tier when taxes
are raised. As a result, the cumulated tax rate ends up too high.
Any authority that raises its tax rate without internalizing the global e⁄ect triggered by
this decision upon the total amount of capital invested neglects the induced shrinkage in the
common base that the other layer will su⁄er. Thus, the marginal cost of public funds is valued
at a lower level than the true marginal cost, thereby leading to excessively high taxes. This is
the vertical tax externality. The same conclusions as in perfect information cases emerge, but
another e⁄ect exerts a downward impact. Actually, as both governments ignore the amount of
capital available and take their decisions simultaneously and non-cooperatively, each of them
10has to grant the agent an informational rent in order to provide her with incentives to reveal her
true type and make the "appropriate" investment choices. As a result, there is also a stacking
of rents, which further reduces the global tax rate that can be levied : this is the asymmetry of
information e⁄ect, that nevertheless cannot o⁄set the vertical externality.
6 Combining Horizontal and Vertical Interactions
The internal organization of countries often gives rise to both vertical and horizontal external
e⁄ects. That￿ s why it is important to analyse the interaction between them in a context involving
asymmetry of information.
In order to examine how vertical and horizontal tax externalities interact, we consider an
institutional structure made of two levels of policymakers and we assume that the hierarchically
lower layer is composed of two governments : i = 1 and 211. All the incumbents are supposed
to be revenue-maximizers. They play simultaneously.



















We successively examine the strategy of each layer of government.
6.1 Problem of the upper-tier authority
We can write the programme in function of the investment choice in one jurisdiction. Hence,
if k represents the total amount the ￿rm invests locally, that is in jurisdictions 1 and 2, and
the levels invested in each of them respectively are k1 and k2, with k1 +k2 = k, then the pro￿t
of the ￿rm writes
U (￿) = max
k;k1
ff (k1) ￿ T
￿ (k1) + f (k ￿ k1) ￿ T
￿ (k ￿ k1) ￿ ￿ (k) + M (￿ ￿ k)g: (11)
As the governments play Nash, the upper-tier authority takes as given the tax rates set by
the lower layer.
Optimizing with respect to k1 yields the following equality




11For a simplicity sake, we assume that two symmetric localities, identical in all relevant aspects, compete
for capital (investments in either jurisdictions are substitute). At equilibrium, tax rates converge and a same
level of capital is allocated in both jurisdictions (this result critically depends on the assumption of decreasing
marginal productivity of capital). It could be relevant to consider the case of asymmetric jurisdictions, which
would be made possible thanks to di⁄erentiated technologies of production.
11The problem can now be written in function of the total amount of capital locally invested
and of the ￿rm￿ s endowment.





















+ M (￿ ￿ k) ￿ U (￿)
￿
g (￿)d￿:
After some computations and rearrangments, its marginal tax rate is :
￿
0 (k) = ￿
1 ￿ G(￿)
g (￿)
M"(￿ ￿ k) (13)
6.2 Problem of a local government
If we come back to the initial expression of the pro￿t of the ￿rm
U (￿) = max
k1;k2
ff (k1) ￿ T (k1) + f (k2) ￿ T (k2) ￿ ￿
￿ (k1 + k2) + M (￿ ￿ k1 ￿ k2)g:
Optimizing with respect to k2 implicitly de￿nes k2 as a function of k1 and ￿ : k￿
2 (k1;￿). As
a by-product, the other same-level government (1) optimizes over the de￿nition set a function
the maximand of which is




2 (k1;￿))￿￿ (k1 (￿) + k
￿




Slightly abusing notations and combining the results from the optimization processes, the

















6.3 Global level of taxation
Let kHV de￿ne the total amount of capital locally invested when both horizontal and vertical
tax externalities are at work simultaneously.
We obtain the following expressions for the marginal tax rates levied respectively by both
layers of government
12T
























which yields the cumulated tax rate
T
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3
5;8i = 1;2;8j = 2;1 (17)
Both vertical and horizontal tax externalities appear. When horizontal competition is in-
troduced, the monopoly power of the upper tier is strengthened. Indeed, he can set a higher
degree of taxation than the lower-level decisionmaker who is induced to soften its in order not













Remark : we can consider that lower-level tax competition leads to a symmetric equilibrium :


















;8j = 2;1 (18)
Proposition 3 : In a multi-level government setting involving some competition between
same-layer authorities, the degree of capital taxation appears higher than in the unique policy-







> T 0 ￿
kU￿
. Informational asymmetries and the downward
pressure exerted by same-layer decisionmakers competition cannot o⁄set the "race to the top"
triggered by the simultaneous taxation of a common base by several levels of government.
Likewise, whether the global degree of taxation is more or less important in such a setting





















Proposition 4 : The cumulated tax rate is set at an intermediary level between the taxes














Two kinds of tax externalities are at work in a multi-level territorial organization. The
￿rst one is a horizontal externality that arises between same-level governments. Each of them
neglects the bene￿cial e⁄ect that raising its tax rate conveys on other jurisdictions (through
the expansion of their tax bases), thereby leading to the equilibrium local tax and public good
provision being ine¢ ciently low. On the other hand, the reverse mechanism emerges in the
vertical tax externality case. When two layers of government tax a common base, they do not
take into account the damaging consequences of an increase in their tax rate for the other tier
(via an erosion of the base), which yields overtaxation.
Most public organizations are characterized by both a stacking of governments and the
existence of many policymakers at a same level. The interplay of both externalities softens the
vertical e⁄ect but do not reverse it. Actually, local governments that cut taxes in a competitive
context are induced to further decrease them in order to partially o⁄set for the greater tax
burden imposed upon ￿rms when another level of government is added. The combination of
both external tax e⁄ects can, to some extend, bring the outcome closer to the unitary solution.
The introduction of information asymmetries modi￿es the outcomes because the principal has
to give up a rent to the agent in order to elicit the private information. However, it cannot
o⁄set the vertical externality.
An issue was not tackled that nevertheless deserves being paid attention. We could consider
that local jurisdictions are asymmetric. Thus, we would get an interesting result according to
which the gap between marginal productivities at the local level would determine the domina-
tion of one e⁄ect.
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